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Utopia (Limited)
The follies of aid and technical assistance aimed at
institution-building in underdeveloped countries have
long been satirised. A century ago, W. S. Gilbert
created Zara, the Girton-educated princess of a tiny
South Pacific Island, who brought home with her 'six
Representatives of the principal causes that have
tended to make England the powerful, happy and
blameless country which the consensus of European
civilisation has declared it to be'. She eagerly advised
her father, the King, to 'place yourself unreservedly in
the hands of these gentlemen and they will reorganise
your country on a footing that will enable you to defy
your persecutors'.
The King did so and retribution soon followed in the
form of universal discontent. The bitterness and
sarcasm with which Gilbert ridiculed the notion of
transferring English institutions to distant tropical
lands brought retribution down on his head, too. As
the public mood of imperialist triumphalism built up
in the 1890s, London audiences fell out of love with
Gilbert and Sullivan. Utopia (Limited); or the Flowers
of Pro gress failed to amuse. It closed after a short run,
rarely to be revived [Wolfson 1976: 147 et passim].
Despite the tradition of satirical attack, the project of
transplanting institutions from place to place
continues unabashed. In fact, it is easy to replicate
institutions in different places; what can sometimes be
difficult is to transfer them through time or across
cultures. This article looks at one sustained effort at
cross-cultural replication of institutions. The area was
that of Indian agriculture. The foreign paradigm was
the USA rather than England and, fortunately, the
results of the effort were rather less unsatisfactory
than in Gilbert's forgotten libretto. Nevertheless,
elements of comedy were not entirely absent.
Community Development (CD) in the 1950s
'The average American might . . . feel disgusted with
many things in India. . . I think you will not feel this
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way', wrote Pandit Nehru to Dr. Albert C. Mayer on
17 June, 1946 [Thorner 1981: 118]. Mayer combined
the technical expertise of an architect and city planner
with the same sympathy for Indian villagers that had
inspired US missionaries like the Wisers in the 1930s
[Wiser and Wiser, 1971]. Having served in India with
the US army during the Second World War, his
original idea was 'a programme of architectural and
physical planning for villages' [Rosen 1985: 49]. This
plan was fortunately dropped in favour of a pilot
scheme of socioeconomic improvement in rural areas.
In 1948, with Nehru's active encouragement, a new
type of CD project was launched in 64 villages of the
then United Provinces (the Etawah Project). It was
modelled on a more localised version of the 'country
extension agents' operating in US farming districts in
the early twentieth century [Rosen 1985: 82].
In 1949, the Nationalist cause in mainland China was
lost, undermining thereby the long American
missionary effort to China. India was seen as the next
domino to defend against communism. As Chester
Bowles, the US Ambassador to India, put it: 'Ifwe lose
India, as we lost China, we shall certainly lose South-
East Asia with the repercussions running all the way
through Africa' [Rosen 1985: 11]. But democracy
could, it seemed, defeat communism only if hunger
and want were diminished. That was the significance
for the US of Etawah. But was this little pilot project
replicable?
Paul Hoffman of the Ford Foundation thought it was:
'There is no reason why all 500,000 of India's villages
could not make a similar advance' to that of the 64
Etawah villages [Rosen 1985]. Such a statement
seemed unremarkable in the messianic and utopian
atmosphere of US thinking about foreign aid at this
time. For had not the lesson of the Marshall Plan
experience been taken to be that the US aid strategy
'must be both global, embracing every part of the
world and total, with political, psychological,
economic and military considerations integrated into
one whole' [Packenham 1973: 42]?
By 1952, the Government of India (Go!) had decided
to build on successes achieved at Etawah - in crop
yield per acre, improved technology, road construction
and the new institution of the 'village level worker'
(VLW) - but, significantly, outside the Ministry of
Agriculture, and created a supraministerial co-
ordinating agency, the Community Projects Admini-
stration, which between 1956 and 1966 was the
separate Ministry of CD. Expansion of CD and
National Extension Service activities was designed to
be dramatically rapid: to cover the entire country by
the end of the Second Five-Year Plan.
The trigger for this decision was the ready availability
of US government (and private foundation) aid funds.
In late 1951, under the Point-4 Technical Assistance
Program, the US Congress voted $50 mn for Indian
development. As one commentator has expressed it:
'probably there was no more compelling reason for
CD's activation than the availability of external
funding and the knowledge that these (government)
funds would lapse if not used within a limited amount
of time' [Sussman 1982: 85]. Between 1951-52 and
1960-61, the US Government and the Ford
Foundation provided more than $100 mn to finance
the CD programme [Brown 1971: 5]. Its isolation from
the existing structures administering agriculture was a
result of the scepticism expressed by the Ministry of
Food and Agriculture about the productivity effects of
a changed rural organisation compared with those of
raising grain procurement prices [Rosen 1985: 72-3].
The Food Minister, A. P. Jam, warned: 'If the Plan
fails, it will wreck on the policy of depressing
agricultural prices'. Probably, neither improved
incentives for farmers nor organisational changes
would have had dramatic results in raising output,
given the absence of a new technology to adopt.
The community development programme in India
illustrates some classic weaknesses of early aid
projects. It was too grandiose. It was undertaken for
essentially political reasons, without a proper
appraisal of its long-term viability. It grossly
underestimated the problems of replicating en masse
the successful features of its pilot project which
depended critically on high-quality VLWs. Local-level
participation was induced by the availability of
foreign-financed equipment, rather than by much
understanding of, or commitment to, the development
objectives of the scheme. Performance was judged in
terms of intermediate objectives, such as the rate of
expenditure of funds, rather than the final objectives
of community development; for instance, over 100
new training centres for VLWs were set up, but only
15 per cent of training time was devoted to agricultural
techniques.
These flawed efforts, did, however, leave a legacy of
new institutions. Its importance was shown when later
agricultural innovations spread fastest and most
effectively in those Districts with most prior VLW
extension work [Evenson and Kislev, 1976]. When
India was subsequently divided into 'development
blocks', a new cadre of village-level personnel was in
place to carry out government-assigned tasks at the
grass roots. Weaknesses remained. The personnel
were often poorly trained, weighed down by a
multiplicity of tasks (including the distribution of
modern inputs), and harassed by representatives of the
rural elite. They were organised in a separate structure
whose jurisdiction boundaries did not coincide with
those of allied public services (irrigation, public works
and electricity) [Hopper 1976: 4-5]. The state
governments saw CD blocks as separate entities fed by
central government funds and so, contrary to the
original intention, concentrated their own funds on
non-CD types of spending.
Yet CD had importantly added to rural institutions a
prerequisite for new and better development initiatives.
It did not resemble the original US 'extension agent
model', but that model's promoters - Ensminger and
Galbraith - eventually recognised that this was not
important, as the model was inappropriate [Rosen
1985: 82].
From Extension to Intensive Development
With the CD initiative having run its course, and with
further Nehru-backed organisational changes in
agriculture having been accepted at the Nagpur
Congress [1959] but afterwards effectively opposed by
key Congress politicians, the development of Indian
agriculture needed a new direction. At about this time,
expansion of farm output via extension of the
cultivated areas was coming up against its limits. The
Ford Foundation, in close consultation with the US
government, funded experts who prepared (with
Indian assistance) a report on the impending 'food
crisis' [Gol 1959]. In an attempt to learn from the
over-rapid expansion of the CD programme, the
report emphasised selectivity, intensity and comple-
mentarity. Agricultural inputs were to be concentrated
on selected districts, in sufficient quantities, and in the
correct proportions: hence, in 1961, the launch of the
Intensive Agricultural District Programme. Somewhat
better yields were obtained in the IADP districts but
the improvement was at first small and patchy.
India's food crisis came to a head in the drought years
1965-66 and 1966-67. In early 1966, the Food Minister,
C. Subramanian, spent $5 mn on 20,000 tonnes of
dwarf wheat from Mexico to be used as seed. This, plus
massive additions to India's fertiliser supplies, marked
the turning point for yields [Hopper 1976:9; Dasgupta
1977: 291, but not until 1968 were the new seeds
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sufficiently widespread to bring about the 'green
revolution', the dramatic rises in wheat yields in
Punjab, Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh in
1968-74.
Thus the selective, packaged approach which IADP
used to spread the use of modern inputs, building on
the block development institutions bequeathed by
CD, was in turn not enough by itself to generate rapid
rural change. Two other elements were needed: the
new seeds and a change in agricultural pricing policy.
From the mid-1960s, high wheat prices were used as
economic incentives for farmers, to adopt better
production practices and to deliver for the government
a good part of the increased surplus. The Gol, in the
face of political pressure from the rich farmers' lobby,
usually pitched its wheat procurement prices above
those recommended by the Agricultural Prices
Commission in the 1970s, and adoption of the new
technology was usually a profitable decision (though
perhaps subject to increased risk), especially on the
larger farms [Dasgupta 1977: 160-8].
The new 'Mexipak' seeds had originally been
developed in Mexico and Pakistan (the Mexican
research being financed by the Rockefeller
Foundation). But the institutions that could adapt the
Mexican seeds to the varied set of agro-climatic
environments within India had to be further
developed in India. The locational adaptation of the
'miracle seeds' required a network of high-quality
agricultural universities and research stations. The
Imperial (later Indian) Agricultural Research Institute,
Pusa - the lAR! - had been set up in 1921 and had
soon produced the innovation of the Pusa wheats:
India had a basic research endowment. But much
more was needed.
As early as 1955, certain US agricultural experts,
acting jointly with Indian counterparts, had reported
to the Gol that the CD programme, which
concentrated on the wider diffusion and application of
existing knowledge of agricultural practices, lacked an
important component for success: adequate agri-
cultural research and education. With US aid, the Go!
then invited a group of American land-grant
universities to establish a number of these around
India; five were set up, on the US model, to train
agricultural technicians and scientists to provide a
flow of improved practices for the VLWs to diffuse.
But, because the VLWs never came near to matching
the US county extension agent model, particularly in
spending so little of their time dealing with
agricultural techniques, these institutions never
developed vital links with the villages and instead
became somewhat isolated and irrelevant.
In addition, in 1956, the Rockefeller Foundation
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helped to set up a modern postgraduate school at the
lAR!. Initially, the research effort was concentrated
on two main goals: higher maize, sorghum and millet
yields (rather than the two major food crops of rice
and wheat); and measuring the fertiliser-responsiveness
of traditional varieties (rather than developing or
adapting highly fertiliser-responsive varieties). Since
the 1960s, however, these priorities have been
superseded and India has developed an indigenous
network of high-quality agricultural universities and
research stations, under the supervision of the Indian
Council for Agricultural Research: 'There are (in
1983) 32 central research institutes and seven soil
conservation research and training institutes. . . (plus)
21 agricultural universities, 73 agricultural colleges
(including those at the agricultural university
campuses) and 21 veterinary colleges' [Krueger and
Ruttan, 1983: 12-70].
In terms of resources employed and scientific activity,
as indicated by published work, the Indian agricultural
research community has grown markedly in quantity
and quality. The contribution of foreign, particularly
US, agricultural experts to this institution-building
process was major, both by helping to identify the
need in the l950s and by financing a set of institutional
models in the 1960s.
Recent World Bank Initiatives and
Institution-Building
As the green revolution in wheat began to reach its
technical limits in the late 1970s, while in rice it seemed
limited to Punjab, Himachal, Delhi and South India,
agricultural progress had to be sought in other
directions. Major avenues were irrigation and the
quality of extension work. By this time, the lead was
being taken, on the non-Indian side, not by the US
government (as with CD) nor by US non-profit
foundations (as with IADP), but by the World Bank,
as both major lender and convener of the Aid-India
Consortium. Recent Bank initiatives, in both
irrigation and extension, have attracted critics of their
institutional aspect, who suggest that some of the
faults evident in the CD programme in the 1950s
reappear in these new formulations.
Since a major imperative of most aid agencies is to
disburse large funds quickly, they are under pressure
to identify quickly-replicable 'success stories' amongst
their experimental projects. There is a danger, not
always avoided, of failing to understand the
determinants of the experimental success, and thus of
building either wrong or inadequate components into
the process of replication. There is, indeed, scepticism
about whether a uniform set of components for
widespread replication is sensible given the varied
environmental conditions of Indian agriculture. These
had required careful, locally specific adaptations of
exotic high-yielding seeds; why not of institutions too?
The Bank's current emphasis is on rotational
irrigation ( Warabandi), outside the Northern 'wheat
revolution' areas where it already operates (in
preference to the existing method of continuous flow).
Bank officers believed that such integrated water
management had shown high returns in terms of
additional grain yield over cost - making it an
obvious candidate for replication - but required
'water users' associations'. Against this, Wade [1982:
177] has argued that the link between warabandi and
the existence of a 'water users' association' is weak. In
the pilot areas of warabandi, no such associations
exist; the system works because the vigilance of
individual farmers is strongly backed up by a
bureaucratic authority. The insistence on the
formation of users' associations seems to derive from
an assumption that 'poor water management is caused
by the negligence and uncooperativeness of the
farmers', plus a hope that 'government itself need not
become involved in such messy problems' as enforcing
a water rotation. Thus, from an alleged misreading of
existing irrigation institutions, there may be born a
whole set of new irrigation institutions, existing on
paper but essentially bogus.
The Bank's current agricultural extension reforms in
India have met similar criticism. Moore (1984) notes
that projects 'supported through foreign aid are
subject to pressures for uniformity, rapid spread and
an appearance of achievement [; these] militate against
genuine institutional development, which requires
time and adaptability'. Currently, the World Bank has
been supporting the 'Training and Visit' (T and V)
system, developed from pilot projects in India and
Turkey in the 1970s. This involves freeing the village-
level worker from non-extension duties, such as the
supply and distribution of inputs; bringing him fully
under the aegis of the Department of Agriculture (in
non-IADP districts); putting heavy emphasis on
training; and channelling this newly-acquired know-
ledge, via specific, simple weekly messages, through a
minority of farmers, contacted according to a strict
schedule of visits.
Moore implies that the Bank should have seen that the
T and V system cut against the existing system of
incentives (given that input supply was a source of
informal income to those concerned with it), and was
adopted, albeit partially, because it provided material
inducements - new vehicles, promotions and larger
budgets - for the senior cadres of the central and state
departments of agriculture [Moore 1984: 3 11-4]. The
extension agent lost informal income, was forced to
switch departments, and was given a much tighter
work schedule. His age and low educational
attainments prevent him from seizing such opportunities
for further training and upward mobility as have been
provided. However, evidence from Haryana and Uttar
Pradesh indicates that T and V is more effective at
getting information to contact farmers, and at getting
them to adopt new practices [Feder and Slade, 1984].
Clearly, the verdict is not yet in. Are the changes
benefiting the farmers, and are they worth all the
additional investment?
The disbursement imperative also affects bilateral aid
to Indian agriculture. For example, a parliamentary
review of the UK's bilateral programme observed:
In the case of British aid against the background of
chronic underspending of the British aid budget, it
is understandable that attempts should have been
made to find projects which would disburse
relatively large sums of money; and that deepening
commitments are entered into to support these
projects on the basis of inadequate appraisal
[House of Commons 1979: xliii].
Nevertheless, it is a compliment to the Bank that its
projects have been studied carefully. This happened
because they are large, important and innovative, and
because critical insights are often incorporated into
the Bank's planning at the next round of development
effort.
In both multilateral and bilateral programmes, one
finds evidence of the phenomenon of 'meeting the
target' [Tendler 1975: 85-107]. A shelf of projects
which is too short leads aid agencies to act as if their
capital is relatively abundant and must be committed
quickly to justify further replenishment. Ill-prepared
projects then inhibit successful institution-building
and lead to unintended and undesired results. These
then lead many commentators to conclude that
institution-building via foreign aid is inherently
impossible and should be abandoned. This is a great
mistake. India over the years has furnished examples
of eventual success (agricultural research), as well as
partial failure (community development) and work-
in-progress (irrigation management, agricultural
extension), where timely criticism can still lead to
successful modification of an initial flawed design.
What have we learned?
The very question, 'can the Indian experience of aid,
institution-building and rural development be usefully
applied in sub-Saharan Africa?', invalidates the
comic-opera account of adopting foreign paradigms.
These are always inappropriate (the humour lies in the
ways used by both donor and recipient to convince
themselves, against their better judgement, that this is
not so ) - but also virtually unavoidable in strategies
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for rapid, large-scale change. Thus the usefulness of a
foreign model is correlated with the speed with which
it is adapted as its initial bad consequences are
discovered, not with its capacity to tolerate adherence
against all odds.
The process of adaptation, in the Indian case, was
additive or cumulative, rather than one of total or
selective substitution. A longish period of experiment
and disappointment preceded the moment when all
the required elements for dramatic change came
together effectively - at least in the most favoured
agricultural areas. An intractable problem required a
complex solution, involving administration, irrigation,
new seeds, fertilisers, credit, insurance, economic
incentives and so on. No single-factor solution was
appropriate; yet a sequence of switching from, say,
organisational change to price reform to new technical
fixes would also have led nowhere.
India's experience makes one doubt the nostrums of
today's Western governments and the ideologues of
the World Bank's Research Department that Africa's
food crisis can be solved by 'getting the prices right'. It
is indeed important that input and output prices are
such that producers are suitably rewarded. But this
simple-minded approach neglects the problems of
improving the elasticity of response of output to price
change, which in a poor and rather hermetic [even if
sophisticated: Richards 1985] agriculture means
discovering and communicating massive technical
changes that prove profitable even in the face of high
risk [Lipton 1985a].
Indeed, the last missing ingredient in India's green
revolution was locally-adapted variants of the new
seeds. This underscores the importance of agricultural
research institutes in defining the exact set of technical
changes, required in particular places to increase
price-elasticity of output. Although foreign funds
cannot provide appropriate knowledge, they can help
to supply the means by which it is produced. If there is
one institution whose effective development should be
a priority for foreign assistance, it is the national
network of agricultural research institutes [Lipton
1985b]. Effective development, in the African context,
is patently not the same as more spending. If, in
Africa, research were focused on those crops which
were chosen for attention in India in the late 1950s
(maize, millet and sorghum), a good step would be
made towards improved mass nutrition. Even more
important are the major African roots and tubers
(yams, cassava, cocoyams) because of their large
calorie contribution to people's diets.
The presence of several high-quality agrarian research
institutes would also be some guarantee against the
lure of successful pilot projects. These have induced
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much false optimism, from Etawah to T and V. The
observed success is a compound of a 'pilot project
effect', deriving from exceptional staff and the
excitement of experiment; favourable circumstances
of time or place, not typical outside the experimental
area; and true, transferable success. Although rapid
replication to a formula may be a poor policy, a
foreign funding agency may well have its own
imperatives for believing, or saying that it believes,
otherwise. If there are also rewards in formula
replication for the higher bureaucracy, they will be
drawn into the collusion. The outcome will be a sham
development which no-one has any interest in
questioning, except the people at the bottom whose
interests it was supposed to serve. And they may be too
alienated or too powerless to protest.
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